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INTRODUCTION

Since September 11th, 2001, the United States Government
has faced the ever-evolving challenge of combating foreign terrorists.
The capture of a suspected terrorist by United States forces presents
several legal issues, including, questions over the nature of the
terrorism suspect’s capture, subsequent treatment and afforded
rights.1
Additionally, United States Government officials face the
controversial decision about what to do with captured terrorism
suspects: either detain them as enemy combatants at Guantanamo
Bay to face a military tribunal, or try them before a civilian court in
the United States.2 Since the attacks of September 11th and the
beginning of the War on Terror, terrorism suspects have been tried in
military tribunals as well as civilian courts. However, under the
current administration, the preferred method has been to seek justice
in civilian courts.3
Recently, suspected ringleader of the 2012 Benghazi terrorist
attack,4 Ahmed Abu Khatallah,5 has been subjected to this policy, and

See Steve Vladeck, Kidnapping Is Legally Dubious, But It’s Also The Best Way
To Get Terrorists, WASH. POST, June 18, 2014 (presenting legal issues regarding
rendition of terrorist suspects).
2 For arguments promoting both sides in one particular case, see Karen
DeYoung, Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, U.S. Captures Benghazi Suspect In Secret
Raid, WASH. POST, June 17, 2014.
3 See Karen DeYoung, Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, U.S. Captures Benghazi
Suspect In Secret Raid, WASH. POST, June 17, 2014.
4 For more information on the Benghazi attack, including background on
Ahmed Abu Khatallah as well as details of the attack from several witnesses close
to Abu Khatallah and present on the night of the attack, see David D. Kirkpatrick,
A
Deadly
Mix
In
Benghazi,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
28,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi.
5 While the English spelling of his name sometimes differs based on the
source, from ‘Khattala’ to ‘Khatallah,’ this comment uses the spelling ‘Khatallah,’
which is used in the formal Indictment filed by the United States Attorney’s Office
for the District of Columbia. See Indictment at 1, United States v. Abu Khatallah,
No.14-141 (2014).
1
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is being tried in a civilian court in Washington D.C. 6 Charged in
relation to the September 11th, 2012, attack on the United States
diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, in which Ambassador J.
Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Information Management
Officer Sean Patrick Smith, and CIA Security Officers Tyrone
Snowden Woods and Glen Anthony Doherty were killed,7 suspected
leader of Ansar al-Sharia, Ahmed Abu Khatallah, was captured by a
team of United States Special Forces in mid-June, 2014.8 After his
capture in Libya, Ahmed Abu Khatallah was immediately transported
to an American military vessel, the USS New York, which transported
Khatallah across the Atlantic Ocean to face trial in federal court in
the District of Columbia.9
The capture and subsequent handling of Ahmed Abu
Khatallah implicates several legal questions surrounding United States
policy regarding the capture of suspected terrorists.10 Despite
questions surrounding the handling of Abu Khatallah, the decision by
the Obama administration to transport Abu Khatallah back to the
United States on an American military ship was both deliberate and
strategic.11 By choosing to transport Abu Khatallah by military ship,12
See Karen DeYoung and Ann E. Marimow, Benghazi Suspect Ahmed Abu
Khattala May Be Brought To U.S. On Navy Ship, WASH. POST, June 18, 2014.
7 See Government’s Motion For Pretrial Detention at 7, United States v.
Abu Khatallah, No.14-141 (2014).
8 See Id. at 10.
9 See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, USS New York, Carrying a Benghazi Suspect, Has
Gone Dark, WASH. POST, June 25, 2014.
10 See Ben Brumfield, What’s Next For Benghazi Terror Suspect Ahmed Abu
Khatallah?, CNN, June 18, 2014.
11 The reasoning for doing so primarily revolves around the rather dubious
nature of the capture of the suspect by extraordinary rendition. The difficulty in
finding countries willing to allow suspects who have been subject to rendition to
pass through their sovereign territory during the process of transporting the
suspect to America makes transportation by way of military ship extremely
convenient, if not necessary. See Ben Brumfield, What’s Next For Benghazi Terror
Suspect Ahmed Abu Khatallah?, CNN, June 18, 2014.
12 Whether the United States is legally able to use the military for purposes
of law enforcement is a separate, distinct legal question. Under the Posse Comitatus
Act, the armed forces are restrained from aiding civilian law enforcement
authorities in keeping the peace and arresting felons. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1978).
See also 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1981) (requiring the Department of Defense to prescribe
6
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the Obama administration had several days to question and search
Abu Khatallah before the vessel reached the United States.13 Further,
because much of the trip from Libya to the United States involved
crossing the Atlantic Ocean, in international waters, FBI agents were
able to search Abu Khatallah without a warrant and question him
without reading him his Miranda rights.14
This article will argue that the current Administration’s
practice of searching individuals without a warrant by way of
transporting suspected terrorists15 on military ships through
international waters is in direct conflict with the Fourth 16
Amendment.17 On its face, this practice appears to comply with
regulations ensuring that the U.S. Navy, among others, does not directly participate
in civilian law enforcement absent authorization by law). The Department of
Justice maintains the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply outside of the territory of
the United States, and as such, for the purposes of this article, it will be assumed
that the United States Government’s practice of using military vessels in a law
enforcement capacity for suspects bound for civilian courts is itself legal. See Int’l
Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The Commanders
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 3.11.3.1, p. 3-13 (2007).
13 See Evan Perez and Holly Yan, Controversy Swirls Over Handling Of Benghazi
Suspect Abu Khatallah, CNN, June 29, 2014 (Ahmed Abu Khatallah questioned
aboard ship for two weeks).
14 See Michael Schmidt, Matt Apuzzo, Eric Schmitt and Charlie Savage, Trial
Secondary As U.S. Questions a Libyan Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014.
15 Ahmed Abu Khatallah is not the first suspected terrorist held aboard
military vessels pending transfer to the United States. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Tests
New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011
(describing the handling of Somali Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame aboard the USS
Boxer); Benjamin Weiser and Eric Schmitt, U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy
Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013 (Libyan Abu Anas al-Libi aboard the USS San
Antonio).
16 The Fourth Amendment reads: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
17 Again, recognizing that contravention of the Fourth Amendment is likely
only a collateral benefit and not the official reasoning for the use of military ships
to transport suspected terrorists, see Note 11 supra. Additionally, this discussion will
be limited to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Abu Khatallah, as well
as similarly situated suspected terrorists. Questions surrounding Miranda and the
Public Safety Exception, while extremely important and relevant to Abu Khatallah,
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numerous Supreme Court cases establishing the extraterritorial reach
of the Fourth Amendment.18 However, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Boumediene v. Bush19 raises questions regarding the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment on a United States military vessel, even if the
ship is located in international waters.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to first understand
the extraterritorial applicability of the Constitution. Part II of this
article will describe the extraterritoriality of the United States
Constitution. Part III will explore the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Boumediene and its impact on the extraterritorial application of the
Constitution. Part IV will examine the United States’ position on the
jurisdiction surrounding American military vessels. Part V discusses a
few policy considerations implicated by the analysis of Parts II-IV.
II.

THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE CONSTITUTION

The extraterritoriality of the Constitution can be broken
down as it applies to three main categories of individuals: (1) nonUnited States citizens present within the territory of the United
States, (2) United States citizens outside of the territory of the United
States, and (3) non-United States citizens outside of the territory of
the United States.
Section A will give a brief overview of the applicability of the
Constitution to the first two categories, non-United States citizens
within the United States and United States citizens abroad. Section B
will give a more in-depth look at the category in which Ahmed Abu

as well as other similarly situated suspected terrorists, are too much to address here
and will be saved for another time.
18 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Fourth
Amendment does not apply to foreign citizens in foreign territories); INS V.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (assuming illegal aliens in the United States
have Fourth Amendment rights); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Constitutional
provisions applicable to United States citizens abroad); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950) (no extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment).
19 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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Khatallah falls, a non-United States citizen located outside of the
United States.
A. Applicability to non-United States Citizens within the United
States, and United States Citizens Abroad.
In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,20 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a Chinese national lawfully living in the United
States could be detained without first receiving notice of the charges
levied against him, while further denying the individual any
opportunity to voice their opposition to the detention. 21 The
Supreme Court held that non-United States citizens present within
the United States are afforded constitutional protections. 22 In
deciding the case, the Court stated the “well-established” principle
that, if an alien is lawfully present in the United States, he is within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment and may not be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process.23
The Supreme Court first addressed whether the Constitution,
and more specifically the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, apply to
United States citizens outside of the United States in Reid v. Covert.24
In Reid, the Court addressed the issue of whether military trials of
civilian spouses of servicemen stationed abroad were constitutional. 25
Upon rehearing and reconsideration, the Supreme Court reversed
their earlier decision26 and held that civilian spouses of servicemen
344 U.S. 590 (1953).
Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 595.
22 Id. at 600.
23 Id. at 596. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (“Once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders.); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-771 (1950) (Mere lawful
presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him
certain rights.).
24 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
25 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
26 See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 487 (1956) (holding that Fifth and
Sixth Amendments do not protect American citizens tried by the American
Government for crimes committed and tried in a foreign land).
20
21
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stationed abroad could not be tried by a military tribunal.27 Trying a
civilian in a military tribunal was held to be in violation of the
civilian’s Fifth28 and Sixth29 Amendment rights.30
The Supreme Court reasoned that, because the United States’
power and authority is solely created by the Constitution, the
Government must act within constitutional limitations.31 The Court
rejected the argument that only fundamental constitutional rights
protect Americans abroad.32 Instead, the Court found in favor of
extending every provision of the Constitution to American citizens,
either at home or in another land.33
Kwong Hai Chew and Reid thus begin to define the breadth and
limits of constitutional applicability. Instead of universal applicability,
the Constitution applies to United States citizens, in the United States
as well as abroad, and to foreign nationals that are lawfully within the
territory of the United States. However, one question remains: do the
provisions of the Constitution restrain the United States when it acts
against a foreign national outside of the territory of the United

Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
The Fifth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “No person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger... nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. V.
29 The Sixth Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
30 Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
31 Id. at 6 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176-180 (1803)).
32 Reid, 354 U.S. at 9.
33 Id. at 9. However, courts have since limited the extent to which some
constitutional provisions apply to citizens outside of the United States. See e.g., In re
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2nd Cir. 2008) (holding that “the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement does not govern searches conducted abroad by
U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.”).
27
28
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States? The Supreme Court first addressed this question in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.34
B. Applicability to non-United States Citizens Outside the United
States.
For decades, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in
Verdugo has stood as the guidepost for determining whether foreign
citizens located outside of the United States have rights under the
United States Constitution. In Verdugo, the Supreme Court addressed
whether the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was violated
when Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents searched the
defendant’s house without a search warrant.35 The Court ultimately
held that because the defendant was a Mexican national, and the
property searched was located in Mexico, the Fourth Amendment did
not apply. 36
The defendant in Verdugo, a citizen and resident of Mexico,
was apprehended by Mexican authorities based on an American
arrest warrant issued in connection with narcotics distribution. 37 The
Mexican citizen was transported to the Mexican-American border
where he was delivered to United States Marshals for arrest.38
Following the arrest, DEA agents, in conjunction with Mexican
Federal Judicial Police Officers searched the defendant’s properties in
Mexicali and San Felipe and seized evidence of the defendant’s
narcotics trafficking.39
At trial, the District Court for the Southern District of
California suppressed the seized evidence, concluding that the Fourth
Amendment applied to the search and that there had been no
justification for searching the premises without a warrant.40 The

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 261.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 262.
Id. at 263.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, although divided, affirmed
the District Court’s ruling by relying on Reid.41 On further appeal, in a
6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to the defendant because at the time of the search, the
defendant “was a citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary
attachment to the United States, and the place searched was located
in Mexico.”42
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority opinion,
examined the function of the Fourth Amendment compared to the
Fifth Amendment, which was at issue in Reid.43 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that while constitutional violations of the Fifth
Amendment occur at trial, violations of the Fourth Amendment are
“fully accomplished” at the time of the search.44 Therefore, even if
there was a constitutional violation of the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights, it occurred solely in Mexico. 45 Remedial exclusion
of the evidence is a separate question and does not touch on the
existence of a constitutional violation in and of itself.46
The Chief Justice, in an effort to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment was meant to apply to foreign nationals,
analyzed the language and history of the Fourth Amendment.47 First,
the language of the Fourth Amendment, using the term of art ‘the
people,’ refers to “a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community.”48
Second, the history of the Fourth Amendment suggests that
its provisions were meant to protect the American people against
arbitrary action by the United States Government, and not intended
to restrain the actions of the United States Government against aliens

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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outside American territory.49 As an example, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that in 1798 Congress passed an act allowing commanders of
both public and private armed vessels of the United States to
“subdue, seize and take any armed French vessel . . . on the high
seas.”50 While some commanders were held liable for seizures beyond
the scope of Congress’ grant of authority, 51 the Supreme Court never
suggested the Fourth Amendment restrained commanders from
conducting such seizures authorized by Congress.52
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist looked at previous case law to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied to the DEA
search conducted in Mexico. 53 The opinion in Verdugo stated that the
Court of Appeals’ global application of the Constitution goes against
precedential cases, known as the Insular Cases.54 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist points out, the Insular Cases55 held that not every
constitutional provision applies to Government activity, even when
the United States may have sovereign power, and that only
fundamental constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of
unincorporated territories of the United States. 56 Because the
Constitution “does not, without legislation and of its own force”
apply to territories ultimately governed by Congress, the claim that

Id. at 266.
Id. at 267. See also §§ 1-2 of An Act Further to Protect the Commerce of
the United States, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578-9.
51 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 177-178 (1804); cf. Talbot v.
Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 31 (1801) (seizure of neutral ship lawful where American
captain had probable cause to believe vessel was French).
52 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial inapplicable in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S.
91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision inapplicable in Philippines);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in
Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (jury trial and indictment by
grand jury provisions inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901) (Revenue Clauses inapplicable to Puerto Rico).
56 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148).
49
50
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protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to aliens in foreign
nations is especially weak.57
In addition to the Insular Cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist found
support for holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
foreign nationals in foreign territories in Johnson v. Eisentrager.58 The
Chief Justice emphasized that while some constitutional provisions
extend beyond the citizenry of the United States, the Eisentrager
opinion emphatically rejected the extraterritorial application of the
Fifth Amendment, as the extraterritorial application of organic law is
a practice that every modern government is opposed to. 59
In contrast to the Insular Cases and Eisentrager, the Chief
Justice distinguished Verdugo from the Reid decision relied on by the
lower courts.60 In quoting from the Reid decision, Chief Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that, “when the government reaches out to
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution provided to protect his life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another
land.”61 While the lower courts interpreted such language as
constraining federal officials under the Fourth Amendment wherever
and against whomever they act, the Chief Justice stated that Reid dealt
with United States citizens abroad and that the holding of Reid is
therefore not applicable to the case at hand.62
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly rejected the contention that
case law dealing with the application of the Constitution to foreign
nationals within the United States63 applies to the case at hand
because the defendant in Verdugo had no voluntary connection with
the United States, and foreign nationals can only avail themselves of
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268 (citing Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149).
339 U.S. 763 (1950) (rejecting the claim that enemy aliens imprisoned in
Germany after World War II are entitled to habeas corpus writs in federal courts
on the ground that their war crimes convictions were violations of the Fifth
Amendment and other constitutional provisions).
59 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 269 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784).
60 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270.
61 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6).
62 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270.
63 See Kwong Hai Chew, supra note 21.
57
58
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the protections of the Constitution when they come within the
territory of, and develop substantial connections with, the United
States.64 In response to Justice Stevens’ concurrence,65 Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
should not turn on the “fortuitous circumstance” that the foreign
national had been transported to the United States prior to the
search. Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that only voluntary
presence in the United States invokes constitutional protections for
foreign nationals.66
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted that in addition to
the reasoning of the Chief Justice, practicality concerns also weigh in
favor of the Fourth Amendment not having any application to
searches of foreign nationals in foreign territories. 67 Justice Kennedy
reasoned that due to the absence of local magistrates or judges in
foreign territories that have the authority or ability to issue American
search warrants, as well as the “differing and perhaps unascertainable
conceptions of reasonableness” in foreign territories, the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment should not apply in foreign
territories as it does in the United States.68 Likewise, Justice Stevens
concurred with the majority opinion that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply, primarily because American magistrates have no
authority to authorize searches in foreign territories.69

64 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 271. (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982)
(“The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are universal in their application,
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction…”) (emphasis in original); Kwong Hai Chew,
344 U.S. at 596(“But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders”) (emphasis in original)).
65 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated that aliens lawfully present in
the United States are protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether
they are present voluntarily or, as in the case at hand, involuntarily. Verdugo, 494
U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).
66 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 272. However, the voluntary presence standard failed
to gain acceptance by a majority of the Court and is therefore dicta.
67 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68 Id. Additionally, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun agreed that the Warrant
Clause does not apply and searches conducted abroad are subject only to the
reasonable aspect of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69 Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Applying the Supreme Court’s previous analyses of the scope
of the Constitution to the Government’s actions in dealing with
Ahmed Abu Khatallah, it seems that the Constitutional protections
of the Fourth Amendment do not apply. First, Abu Khatallah is not a
citizen of the United States, and therefore cannot avail himself of the
Fourth Amendment’s protections on the grounds of citizenship.
Second, the search of Abu Khatallah did not occur in the territory of
the United States, but rather occurred in international waters,
eliminating the protections of the Fourth Amendment afforded noncitizens within the United States. Lastly, while an argument can be
made that Abu Khatallah was in the possession of the United States
when he was searched, the Chief Justice’s “voluntary connection”
language from Verdugo suggests that because Abu Khatallah had no
connection to the United States other than his capture and
subsequent rendition to justice, which is most certainly not a
voluntary connection, the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
Following the Verdugo holding, the United States could have
viably searched, without a search warrant, not only Abu Khatallah’s
physical person in international waters, but also any properties owned
by Abu Khatallah outside of the United States (i.e., his house in
Libya). However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush
raises questions as to whether the Constitution in fact does apply to
Abu Khattallah, and whether the Government’s search of Abu
Khatallah was legal.
III.

BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH AND DE FACTO JURISDICTION
THROUGH EXCLUSIVE CONTROL

In Boumediene, the Supreme Court dealt with several issues
revolving around foreign national enemy combatants held at
Guantanamo Bay.70 Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed
whether foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay could avail
themselves of the constitutional protection of the Writ of Habeas
70

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
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Corpus.71 The Supreme Court in Boumediene denied the Government’s
argument that the foreign nationals were held in territory outside of
the Nation’s borders, which therefore leaves the detainees without
constitutional rights,72 and concluded that foreign nationals detained
as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay may invoke the
protections of habeas corpus.73 In doing so, the Supreme Court
created a functional test to determine the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution. 74
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that
pursuant to the agreement between Cuba and the United States, Cuba
retains “ultimate sovereignty,” while the United States exercises
“complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo Bay.75 Because
of this division of power, Justice Kennedy stressed that while Cuba
has de jure jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay, the United States
nonetheless has de facto jurisdiction.76 This distinction ultimately lead
Justice Kennedy to conclude that “[i]n every practical sense
Guantanamo [Bay] is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction
of the United States.”77 Because of the “complete and total control”
of the United States over Guantanamo Bay, foreign detainees held
there could avail themselves of the constitutional protections of
habeas corpus.78
Justice Kennedy found support for the holding in the lack of
prudential concerns previously preventing the extension of habeas
corpus to territories under the sovereign control of a different
nation.79 Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that there was no reason
Id.
Id. at 739.
73 Id. at 798.
74 Id. at 764.
75 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753. See also Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval
Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, Art. III, T.S. No. 418.
76 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755.
77 Id. at 769.
78 Id. at 771.
79 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751. See generally King v. Cowle, 2 Burr. 834 (As a
territory that was not a part of England, yet controlled by the English monarch, the
writ of habeas corpus was never extended to Scotland); R. Sharpe, The Law of
Habeas Corpus 191 (2d ed. 1989). See also Note on the Power of English Courts to
71
72
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to believe that a federal court’s order would be disobeyed at
Guantanamo Bay, and that no other law besides that of the United
States applies to the naval base.80
Additionally, Justice Kennedy attempted to reconcile his
functional holding with previous case law. First, in addressing the
Insular cases, Justice Kennedy found that by utilizing the doctrine of
territorial incorporation,81 the Court devised a functional approach to
the application of the Constitution.82 This approach served as a
foundation to the functional approach established by the Supreme
Court in Boumediene.83
Second, Justice Kennedy found support for his holding in the
practical concerns that influenced the Court in Reid.84 Justice
Kennedy read Reid to rely not on the citizenship of the petitioners,
but instead on the petitioner’s place of confinement and trial.85
Relying primarily on Justice Frankfurter’s and Justice Harlan’s
concurrences in Reid, Justice Kennedy noted that Reid rejected a rigid
rule in favor of analyzing the circumstances of each particular case
when applying the Constitution extraterritorially.86

Issue the Writ of Habeas to Places Within the Dominions of the Crown, But Out
of England, and On the Position of Scotland in Relation to that Power, 8 Jurid.
Rev. 158 (1896).
80 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751.
81 Under the doctrine of territorial incorporation, utilized in the Insular cases,
the Constitution is fully incorporated and applies only to territories destined for
statehood. For unincorporated territories (those not destined for statehood) the
Constitution only applies in part, determined by the situation of the territory and its
relationship to the United States. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143.
82 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759. See also Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312.
83 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
84 Id. at 759.
85 Id. at 760.
86 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768. In his concurrence to Reid Justice Harlan
rejected a “rigid and abstract rule,” reading the Insular cases to mean that
constitutional provisions’ extraterritorial effect depends on the particular
circumstances, particularly whether judicial enforcement would be “impracticable
and anomalous.” Reid, 351 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). See also
Reid, 351 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
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Lastly, to reconcile his holding with the holding of Eisentrager,
Justice Kennedy distinguished Landsberg prison from Guantanamo
Bay on the basis that, while both are located outside the sovereign
territory of the United States, Guantanamo Bay is under the exclusive
control of the United States, whereas Landsberg prison was under
the control of the combined Allied Forces.87 In an attempt at further
reconciliation, Justice Kennedy noted that nothing in Eisentrager
stated that de jure sovereignty has ever been the only consideration in
determining the reach of the Constitution.88 Justice Kennedy thus
concluded that “a common thread” used to determine “questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism[,]” and thus unites the Insular cases, Eisentrager, and Reid.89
However, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in
Boumediene, the majority completely missed the mark with Eisentrager,
which “conclusively establishes the opposite” of a functional test for
extraterritoriality.90 Quoting Justice Jackson in Eisentrager, Justice
Scalia noted, “in extending constitutional protections beyond the
citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the
alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the judiciary
power to act.”91 From the language in Eisentrager, Justice Scalia
concluded that Eisentrager “held beyond any doubt - that the
Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United
States in areas over which our Government is not sovereign.”92
The Insular cases, Reid, and Eisentrager, do in fact stand for the
same idea, as observed by the majority. However, the majority
interpreted these cases incorrectly. Instead of standing for a
functional approach to extraterritoriality, Justice Scalia pointed out
that, like Eisentrager, the Insular cases stand for the proposition that
aliens outside of United States sovereign territory do not have
87 Boumedien, 553 U.S. at 768. The United States was therefore “answerable
to its Allies” for all activities occurring at Landsberg prison. Id.
88 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 834 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91 Boumedien, 553 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Eisentrager, 339
U.S. at 770-71).
92 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 835 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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constitutional rights.93 Quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico,94 Justice Scalia
stated that, “The Constitution of the United States is in force in
Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the sovereign power of that
government is exerted.”95 Moreover, all of the Justices of the Reid
majority, save one, limited their analysis to the rights of citizens
abroad.96
The Insular cases dealt with territory that was a part of the
United States’ sovereign territory,97 the Reid Court addressed the
rights of citizens abroad, and Eisentrager specifically declined to
extend constitutional privileges to foreign nationals outside of United
States sovereign territory. Functional approach or not, the idea that
the Constitution applies to foreign nationals outside of the United
States’ sovereignty can not be found in any of the Supreme Court’s
previous opinions. Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s ultimate holding in
Boumediene, Justice Frankfurter stated in his concurrence that, while
the “deck of a private American vessel . . . is considered for many
purposes constructively as territory of the United States . . . persons
on board such vessels . . . cannot invoke the protection of the
provisions [of the Constitution] until brought within the actual
territorial boundaries of the United States.”98 Thus, the functional de
jure versus de facto sovereignty approach adopted by the majority in
Boumediene is not only judicially created, but is a blatant
misconstruction and revision of the Court’s previous case law in a
weak attempt at justification.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258 U.S. 298 (1922). Justice Kennedy cited this case in concluding that
the Insular Cases created a functional test for the application of the Constitution to
American territories. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758.
95 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. at 312.) (emphasis added).
96 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6
(plurality opinion of Black, J., Harlan, J., and Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
Justice Frankfurter was the only Justice in the majority that did not limit the
analysis to American citizens abroad. However, Justice Frankfurter went a step
further and limited his analysis to civilian dependents of American military abroad,
an even narrower class.
97 See Boumediene, 553. U.S. at 839; Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 268; Reid, 354 U.S. at
13 (plurality opinion of Black, J.).
98 Reid, 354 U.S. at 55-6. (quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
93
94
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Although Boumediene seems to have rewritten the Insular cases,
Reid, and Eisentrager, and did not overrule Verdugo despite being in
direct contradiction to it, it is still controlling law. Therefore, there is
a rather gray area of law regarding the application of the Constitution
to foreign national terror suspects held aboard American military
vessels that are located in international waters. Under Eisentrager and
Verdugo, the Fourth Amendment would not apply to the search of a
foreign-national terrorism suspect, so long as the search occurs
outside of the territory of the United States, where the United States
lacks de jure sovereignty. Under Boumediene, however, the Fourth
Amendment seemingly applies to a search of such foreign-national
terrorism suspects if conducted within an area where the United
States exercises de facto sovereignty through ‘complete and total
control,’ in addition to searches conducted within the de jure
sovereignty of the United States. While the Eisentrager/Verdugo and
Boumediene rules may lead to the same result in some cases, such as if a
search of a foreign-national terrorism suspect occurred within the
sovereign territory of the United States, the same cannot be said
when the search is conducted where the United States only exercises
de facto, and not de jure sovereignty.
Such a situation is in fact presented by the handling of
Ahmed Abu Khatallah by the United States Government. By
searching Abu Khatallah on a military vessel in international waters,
the United States searched Abu Khatallah in a location where the
country certainly lacks de jure jurisdiction (by virtue of being in
international waters), yet arguably exercises de facto jurisdiction (by
virtue of being on an American military vessel). Applying the
Boumediene holding to the actions of the Government in dealing with
Abu Khatallah, his search would not be legal, absent a warrant, if the
military vessel on which the search occurred can be equated to being
under de facto sovereignty of the United States.
One significant question thus arises: was Ahmed Abu
Khatallah within the ‘complete and total control’ of the United States
when he was searched while being held on the American military ship
in international waters? The answer to this question may dictate not
only the legality of the Government’s actions with Abu Khatallah,
but also may impact the future course of conduct of the United
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States in dealing with similarly-situated terrorism suspects that have
been captured.
IV.

DOES THE UNITED STATES EXERCISE DE FACTO
SOVEREIGNTY OVER AMERICAN MILITARY SHIPS IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERS?

In determining whether an American military vessel in
international waters is equivalent to Guantanamo Bay for Boumediene
purposes, several sources may help shed light on how the vessel
should be treated. One such source is the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.99
Designed to define the rights and responsibilities of nations
regarding the world’s oceans, the Convention on the Law of the Sea
states that, “[s]hips have the nationality of the State whose flag they
are entitled to fly,”100 and that, “ships shall sail under the flag of one
State only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas.”101 Additionally, the Convention goes further in specifying
that warships on the high seas “have complete immunity from the
jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.”102 Lastly, the
Convention mandates that every State shall “assume jurisdiction
under its internal law over each ship flying its flag.”103
Following the language in the Convention of the Law of the
Sea and the rule laid down in Boumediene, a search of Ahmed Abu
Khatallah aboard an American military ship in international waters
would be subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 243.
100 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 91, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243.
101 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 92, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243.
102 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 95, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243.
103 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 94, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 243.
99
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Because he was searched on an American military vessel, the ship
carries the nationality of the United States and is subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The “internal law” that the
Convention subjects the ship to as an American vessel most certainly
refers to the United States Constitution, including the provisions of
the Fourth Amendment.
The provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea do
not bind the United States because the United States has not become
a signatory party to the Convention. 104 However, customary
international law echoes the rule eventually adopted by the
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Predating the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated
in The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey)105 [hereinafter “the Lotus
case”], “a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the
State the flag of which it flies.”106 Furthermore, the Lotus case points
out that “a ship is placed in the same position as national territory,”
and that “what occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be
regarded as if it occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the
ship flies.”107
While the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea may not
bind the United States, the Lotus case does bind the United States
absent conflicting domestic law.108 Because neither Congress nor
104 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. &
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. 163 (2014). But see Id. at n.
13 (describing support for US ratification, including support from former
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush).
105 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10
(Sept. 7).
106 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10,
¶ 65 (Sept. 7).
107 Id.
108 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that customary
international law is binding on the United States in the absence of conflicting
domestic law). On the other hand, courts have held that customary international
law is not controlling where Congress has specifically enacted a law on the issue. See
Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other
grounds, 946 F.2d 1481 (1991) (holding that the customary norm of safe haven in
times of civil war was preempted by the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 and
the executive act of voluntary departure).
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courts have directly dealt with the territorial characteristics of military
vessels, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations is perhaps the most important tool in analyzing the way
the United States Government views its military vessels, as well as the
jurisdictional laws surrounding them. It is therefore helpful in
determining whether an American military vessel can be equated to
Guantanamo Bay for Boumediene purposes of applying the
Constitution to foreign nationals.
According to the Commander’s Handbook, which provides
guidance for American military officers “on the rules of law
governing naval operations in peacetime and during armed
conflict,”109 United States Naval policy requires warships to assert the
rights of sovereign immunity.110 The privilege of sovereign immunity
entitles all U.S. warships and United States ships (USS) to “exclusive
control over persons onboard such vessels with respect to acts
performed onboard.”111 More importantly, the Commander’s
Handbook states, “U.S. law applies at all times aboard U.S. vessels as
the law of the flag nation and is enforceable on U.S. vessels . . .
anywhere in the world.”112
Similar to the Commander’s Handbook, the Judge Advocate
General’s Operational Law Handbook, which acts as a “how to”
guide for military lawyers113 declares that state craft, including
warships, are “absolutely immune on the high seas.”114

Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, p. 3 (2007).
110 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 2.2.2, p. 2-2 (2007).
111 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 2.1, p. 2-1 (2007).
112 Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Navy, NWP 1-14M, The
Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, § 3.11.2.1, p. 3-10
(2007).
113 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. &
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. i (2014).
114 Int’l & Operational Law Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. &
Sch., U.S. Army, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, p. 174 (2014) (citing article
109
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Both the Commander’s Handbook and the Operational Law
Handbook strongly suggest that American military ships in
international waters are essentially United States territory abroad, and
certainly under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United
States. Both the Commander’s Handbook and the Operational Law
Handbook thus can be said to equate an American military ship in
international waters to Guantanamo Bay, for de facto jurisdictional
purposes. Similar to the Boumediene reasoning of “complete and total
control” that the United States holds over Guantanamo Bay, the
Commander’s Handbook gives the United States “exclusive control”
over military vessels such as the one used to transport Ahmed Abu
Khatallah.
Moreover, the Commander’s Handbook specifically states
that U.S. law applies at all times on American flagged vessels. Surely,
U.S. law refers to the whole Constitution including the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, the United States Government must abide
by the Fourth Amendment when it searches terrorism suspects like
Ahmed Abu Khatallah aboard an American military vessel, even if
the vessel is located in international waters.
V.

RAMIFICATIONS OF EXTENDING FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS TO FOREIGN NATIONALS HELD ABOARD
AMERICAN MILITARY SHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

The practice of extending the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment to foreign nationals held aboard an American military
vessel in international waters raises several important policy
considerations. Firstly, who has the jurisdiction to issue warrants for
such searches? Could any federal judge in the United States issue
such a warrant? Or would it be limited to judges within a certain
jurisdiction? And if so, which jurisdiction? Similarly, what court can
hear challenges to such warrants? Would it be the district court to
which the suspect is ultimately brought? Or would it be a special
court created specifically for such purposes?
95 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea). See also Id. at 171 (providing complete
sovereign immunity for State vessels).
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The second policy consideration implicated by such a
decision is what effect that decision will have on future dealings with
captured terrorism suspects. The United States can easily defeat
having to grant the protections of the Fourth Amendment to a
foreign suspect by delaying the suspect from reaching an American
vessel. Capturing forces could take the time to search and interrogate
the suspect in the nation where the capture takes place before
transporting the suspect back to the United States. However, this
would result in added delay, and most likely added risk for both the
capturing forces and the captured suspect, who would have to spend
more time in a likely hostile environment. The consequences of
extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to foreign
suspects aboard American ships in international waters could
therefore result in a failure to even prevent a search of the suspect
without a warrant, while at the same time place American citizens,
and even the foreign suspect himself, at greater harm.
A third important policy consideration is the likelihood of
compliance with such a rule. Compliance with such a rule ultimately
relies on whether the information resulting from a search would later
be used or excluded from the trial of the captured terrorism suspect.
Exclusion of ill-gotten information would most likely help ensure
compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
However, if the Government already has a strong enough case (and if
the Government is going to exercise its rendition powers, it likely has
a strong enough case already) then exclusion of the information
resulting from the search would not be of much consequence.
Searches would be conducted more for intelligence value rather than
evidentiary value during a subsequent prosecution, and the threat of
future exclusion of information gained would therefore not stop
searches when a warrant is unable to be obtained. The rule requiring
a warrant would thus prove toothless, all the while unnecessarily
restricting the later prosecution of the captured suspect.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the history of decisions regarding the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution, from Eisentrager to Verdugo, seems to
260
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suggest that the United States Government’s search of Ahmed Abu
Khatallah aboard a ship in international waters is legal, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Boumediene challenges that theory.
Following the Verdugo holding and Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Reid, the Fourth Amendment would not be applicable
to foreign nationals held aboard American ships in international
waters. However, following the more recent Boumediene holding,
because the American military vessel on which he was searched is
subject to the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United States,
despite being in international waters and outside United States
territory, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would seemingly
extend to Abu Khatallah just as the protections of a habeas corpus
petition extended to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in
Boumediene. In other words, the Fourth Amendment would protect
Abu Khatallah because an American military ship in international
waters is “not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the
United States.”115
Regardless of the lack of value and heavy burden produced
by such a rule, in light of Boumediene, the Fourth Amendment, as well
as the rest of the Constitution, likely applies to foreign terrorism
suspects held aboard American military vessels, even if the ships are
located in international waters. This unintended consequence of the
Boumediene decision leaves the United States Government operating in
a dubious zone of legality when it searches terrorist suspects aboard
military vessels absent a warrant, and may ultimately necessitate a
change in the way the United States deals with captured terrorism
suspects in the future.

115

See Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 at 769; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480

(2004).
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